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SYMPOSIUM
CONTRACT THEORY AND SECURITIES
ARBITRATION: WHITHER CONSENT?'
Richard E. Speidelt
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the role of consent in securities arbi-
tration.' It examines the consensual underpinnings of the con-
"1996 Richard E. Speidel. All Rights Reserved.
Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. My
thanks to Rob Spalding, Northwestern Law School Class of 1998, for research
assistance and to my colleague, Ian R. Macneil, for comments on an earlier draft.
Research for this Article was supported by a grant from the Julius Rosenthal
Foundation. I served as a member of the National Association of Securities
Dealers' Arbitration Policy Task Force. The views expressed in this Article are
mine and are not necessarily those of the Task Force.
' By securities arbitration I mean both the contract to arbitrate between a
customer and a broker-dealer and the arbitration rules and processes of a cogni-
zant self regulating organization ("SRO"), such as the National Association of Secu-
rities Dealers ("NASD"). See Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success
Story: What Does the Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FORESr L. REv. 183 (1996); see also
IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBI-
TRATION LAW: AGREiMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRA-
TION ACT ch. 13 (1994 & Supp. 1996); New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium
on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1121 (1995). These
rules are incorporated by reference in the contract and regulated by the Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Under the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78
(1994), a broker-dealer must register with the SEC and a self regulating organiza-
tion. The SEC has power to regulate broker-dealers but has delegated some of
that power to the SROs. Thus, broker-dealers registered with an SRO must submit
to the rules of the SRO. The SRO, which performs a mix of private and public re-
sponsibilities, must be approved by the SEC and is subject to SEC oversight.
Thus, SROs must file proposed rules, including arbitration rules, with the SEC,
and no rule or rule change is approved unless it is consistent with the Securities
Act. The SEC may take the initiative to abrogate, to add or to delete an SRO
rule. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-f (1994). Although the line is difficult to draw, the courts
have held that an SRO's actions when conducting or administering a securities
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tract to arbitrate disputes arising between private par-
ties-customers and broker-dealers-in a regulated industry.2
By consent I mean both an agreement to arbitrate, ex-
pressed in a signed writing, and the power of the parties to
agree on the scope and nature of the arbitration process. Arbi-
tration law, whether federal or international, requires a writ-
ten agreement to arbitrate.' The concern is how that agree-
ment is manifested and validated and the content of the con-
tract to arbitrate existing and future disputes.4
There are two sides to the consent coin. One side involves
the power of private parties to create the contract to arbitrate,
arbitration are private rather than government action. See Glennon v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994), affd,
83 F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1996); First Heritage Corp. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Deal-
ers, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Mich. 1992). For a more detailed discussion, see
Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 83, 145-55 (1996). I will not discuss arbitration between employees and bro-
ker-dealers. See, e.g., Ware, supra, at 145-55; Developments in the Law: Employ-
ment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1670, § VI Mandatory Arbitration of Stat-
utory Employment Disputes (1996). Nor will I discuss whether nonsignatories of a
written agreement are, nevertheless, bound to arbitrate. See II MACNEIL, SPEIDEL
& STIPANOWICH, supra, ch. 18.
2 For the most recent regulatory phase, see Symposium, The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 975 (1996).
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994): A "written provision . . . to settle by arbitra-
tion . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable . . . ." United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Id. §§ 201-08.
Arbitration has three important characteristics: (1) agreement to the process
by the parties; (2) adjudication by private arbitrators of the dispute after the par-
ties have an opportunity for a fair hearing, and (3) finality of the award on the
merits. See I MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 1, § 2.1.3; see also
Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 84-88
(1992) (arbitration characterized by private proceedings, subordination of substan-
tive law, informal procedures, finality, expertise and lack of jury); Richard E.
Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The
Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 157, 158-67 (1989) (classic model
of arbitration). The objective is to produce a system that is "cost effective, proce-
durally consistent, and fair, and capable, as a matter of course, of producing out-
comes that are accurate and correct." Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commer-
cial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and a Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 414 (1995). The factors involved in choosing among arbi-
tration and other methods of dispute resolution are analyzed in Robert A. Baruch
Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional
Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 893; see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (empirical study of arbitration practice in
a particular industry).
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state its terms, select arbitration rules and control administra-
tion of the process. How far may the parties go without run-
ning into the limitations of public policy? The other side-the
darker side-involves the scope of freedom from contract which
arises in the so-called contract of "adhesion." How far may one
party with superior bargaining power go to require arbitration,
define the terms of the contract to arbitrate and control the
procedures and processes of arbitration?' It is fair to say that
securities arbitration is located on the dark side of the arbitra-
tion coin, since the contract to arbitrate is essentially a con-
tract of adhesion.
The contract to arbitrate securities disputes, as well as
disputes arising under most commercial contracts, is governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").' Thus, the require-
ment and role of consent must be assessed within this legisla-
tion, enacted by Congress in 1925, and interpreted by the Su-
preme Court and the other federal courts. This rich, complex
and often controversial body of law creates the framework
within which consent issues arise and are resolved. As we
shall see, federal arbitration law celebrates the bright side of
the consent coin when enforcing the contract to arbitrate and
provides broad power to structure the arbitration process by
agreement. On the darker side, however, the Court has inter-
preted the FAA in a manner that avoids validity and public
policy questions. Power to regulate adhesion contracts and
other disputes over arbitrability is left to Congress, the SEC
and, under limited circumstances, to the states. The "freedom
to contract side of the consent coin, therefore, has flourished
under the FAA while the darker side has been largely ig-
nored.'
' Questions of "freedom to" and "freedom from contract are pervasive in the
law of contracts. See Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Con-
tract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 254, 258-61 (1995).
6 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
' The theme of increased contract enforcement by the Supreme Court at the
expense of public policy and other defenses is identified and criticized in G. Rich-
ard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433 (1993).
For other critiques of contract law in the Supreme Court, see Jean Braucher, The
Afterlife of Contract, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 49, 61-69 (1995) (stating that Court has
emitted a "blinding fog" of free market ideology that seems to have obscured reali-
ty); Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 Nw. U. L. RFV. 89, 95-
106 (1995).
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Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon8 was an im-
portant milestone for securities arbitration on the enforcement
side of the consent coin. There, the Supreme Court held that
claims arising under the Securities Act of 1934 were arbitrable
under the terms of a "broad" arbitration clause9 and, shortly
thereafter, held that claims arising under section 14 of the
Securities Act of 1933 were also arbitrable. ° Securities arbi-
tration and the role of consent, however, are still in transition.
The nature of the transition and current problems are cap-
tured and assessed in the so-called Ruder Report, published in
January 1996.11 After reviewing and assessing the Ruder Re-
port, Dean Joel Seligman concluded that consent in securities
arbitration is a "legal fiction" and that "mandatory arbitration"
is a more accurate characterization. 2 Although this assess-
ment may overstate the problem, it pinpoints a clear trend. At
a time when the post-McMahon Supreme Court is extolling the
virtues of arbitration contract enforcement, the role and impor-
tance of consent in securities arbitration has withered.
Because important issues of public policy are involved, the
question after Ruder is whether consent should be revitalized
as a primary factor in securities arbitration or whether an
unabashedly public law model of securities arbitration should
482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
The written arbitration clause in McMahon provided: "Unless unenforceable
due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to my ac-
counts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc., as I
may elect." Id. at 223.
10 Rodgriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). These developments are
treated in II MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPAN OWICH, supra note 1, at 16-30.
11 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, SEcuRITIEs ARBITRATION
REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE (1996) [hereinafter
RUDER REPORT]; see Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration
Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 HOUs. L. REV. 327 (1996). For commentary on
the Seligman article, see Brandon Becker, Commentary, 33 HOUs. L. REV. 369
(1996); John C. Coffee, Jr., Commentary, 33 Hous. L. REv. 376 (1996); Richard E.
Speidel, Commentary, 33 HOuS. L. REV. 385 (1996). For a summary of securities
arbitration law prior to the Ruder Report, see Mahlon M. Frankhauser, Arbitra-
tion: The Alternative to Securities and Employment Litigation, 50 BUS. LAW. 1333
(1995).
12 See Seligman, supra note 11, at 330, 339-46.
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be developed by the SROs under a more aggressive SEC over-
sight. In short, should the SEC and the SROs intervene even
more to insure fairness in the terms of the contract to arbitrate
and to regulate the arbitration process? Unless the role of
consent can be revitalized, the answer to this question is yes.
I. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE FAA THE
FRAMEWORK FOR CONSENT
In securities arbitration, the parties sign a written con-
tract which contains a written arbitration clause that is quite
broad: The parties typically agree that "all controversies which
may arise between us, including but not limited to those in-
volving any transaction or the construction, performance, or
breach of this or any other agreement between us, whether
entered into prior, on, or subsequent to the date hereof, shall
be determined by arbitration.""3 If a dispute arises and one
party attempts to initiate arbitration, the other party might
raise four consent (or arbitrability) related defenses under
section 2 of the FAA .4 (1) there was no agreement in writing
to arbitrate anything (the formation question); (2) the dispute
involved or the remedy awarded was not within the scope of
the written agreement to arbitrate (the scope question); (3) the
written agreement to arbitrate was induced by fraud or duress,
was entered by mistake, or was unconscionable (the validity
defense); and (4) although the dispute is otherwise arbitrable,
it was not suitable or appropriate for arbitration (the public
policy exception). If a party is successful on any ground, arbi-
tration will not be compelled.
' See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, UNIFORMI CODE OF
ARBITRATION §§ 1(a), 31 (1994).
"' FAA § 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a con-
tract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
15 Arbitrability issues may be raised by the petitioner's motion to compel arbi-
tration under FAA § 4, 9 U.S.C. § 4, or to stay litigation pending arbitration un-
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The Supreme Court has provided a purposeful, pro-en-
forcement interpretation of the FAA that has limited the via-
bility of these defenses. Because McMahon is an important
part of this process, the enforcement tale bears a brief retell-
ing.1
6
First, the Court has interpreted the FAA to create and im-
plement an "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution" 7 and a "substantial federal concern for the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements." 8 Except for disputes
over whether the parties agreed to permit the arbitrators to
decide questions of arbitrability,"9 this liberal policy works as
a tie breaker in interpretation and other disputes. It reflects a
judgment that arbitration, on balance, is more efficient than
litigation in resolving disputes" and that the federal contract
to arbitrate should be enforced. But the Court has frequently
stated that the preeminent concern of the FAA is to place pri-
der FAA § 3, 9 U.S.C. § 3. The issue may also be raised by a motion to enjoin
arbitration or a motion for a declaratory judgment.
16 For a more detailed overview, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, Sup. CT. REV. 331 (1996); Stephen L. Hayford, Commer-
cial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995. A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1 (1996).
17 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985). The Court in McMahon stated that the FAA established a "federal policy
favoring arbitration" and required that agreements to arbitrate be rigorously en-
forced. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 2
(1983)).
'8 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996).
19 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1925 (1995),
where the Court held that the question whether a party had agreed to arbitrate
anything other than disputes over the scope of an arbitration agreement was not
aided by a "strong arbitration-related policy favoring" arbitration. The basic objec-
tive in disputes over contract formation is to enforce arbitration agreements ac-
cording to their terms and "not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possi-
ble, no matter what the parties' wishes." Id.; see Leadertex v. Morganton Dyeing
& Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 27-29 (2d Cir. 1995); Alamria v. Telcor Int'l, Inc.,
920 F. Supp. 658, 662-64 (D. Md. 1996) (restating FAA arbitrability principles).
For a critique of the "presumption of arbitrability" prior to First Options, see Jon-
athan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the Presumption of Arbitrability: David L.
Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 58 BROOK L. REv. 279 (1992).
20 It also reflects an implicit judgment that civil court dockets are clogged and
that arbitration is one way to deal with the problem. See Shell, supra note 7, at
517. Shell argues that if judicial economy is the tail that wags the arbitration dog,
it ill serves the notion that courts, not arbitral tribunals, are the primary institu-
tion for dispensing public justice.
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vate contracts to arbitrate "upon the same footing as other
contracts."2 The liberal policy, therefore, is employed primari-
ly to facilitate the equal enforcement objective.
Second, unless the parties have expressly agreed other-
wise, federal courts rather than arbitrators decide questions of
arbitrability raised by attacks on the arbitration clause itself.
All other questions, including aspects of procedural
arbitrability, are for the arbitrators if within the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate.' Thus, the courts rather than the ar-
bitrators are usually in control of the enforcement process.
Third, the Court has interpreted the broad arbitration
clause to include all claims related to the contract, including
federal and state statutory claims designed to regulate the
contract for the benefit of a class of protected persons, such as
consumers or franchisees.' Unless the parties have agreed to
exclude the regulatory claim, or Congress has clearly reserved
the dispute for adjudication in court, the matter will be re-
ferred to arbitration.24 This is the holding of McMahon where
securities arbitration claims are involved. Lurking beneath this
outcome is the Court's assumption that arbitrators are capable
of deciding statutory claims and that such claims are appro-
priate for arbitration. The Court's justification for this conclu-
sion is that unless Congress has stated otherwise, the nature
of the claim is irrelevant since adjudication is simply shifted
21 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting HR. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924)); see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
116 S. Ct 1652, 1656 (1996).
" This is the Prima Paint doctrine of "separability." Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see I MACNEIL, SPEIDEL &
STIPANOWICH, supra note 1, § 15.2-15.3.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 627-
28 (1985). In rejecting a claimed presumption against including statutory claims in
a broad arbitration clause, the Court refused "to color the lens through which the
arbitration clause is read." Id. at 628; see generally Edward Brunet, Arbitration
and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81 (1992) (doubting compatibility of
classical arbitration and constitutional rights); Edward K4. Morgan, Contract Theory
and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1059 (1987) (doubting arbitrability of "public policy" rights).
" See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-27 (1991) (re-
stating the principles).
1996] 1341
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
from a court to an arbitral panel: The parties do not forego
substantive rights, they simply submit them for resolution in
an "arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."25
Fourth, the Court has interpreted the FAA's scope as coex-
tensive with the power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce.26 It has consistently held that within this broad scope,
a state law that discriminates against or treats the federal con-
tract to arbitrate differently from other contracts is preempted.
Thus, a state statute that excludes state created claims other-
wise within the scope of the federal contract to arbitrate from
arbitration,27 or state arbitration law that is inconsistent with
federal arbitration law28 or imposes different conditions on
the enforceability of contracts to arbitrate than are imposed on
other contracts, is not enforceable.29 This preemption doctrine
protects the enforceability of the federal contract to arbitrate,
as interpreted by the Court, and effectively neutralizes state
regulation of arbitration contracts subject to the FAA.2
Fifth, defenses to arbitrability under the so-called "savings
clause" of FAA section 2, such as fraud, duress, mistake and
unconscionability, or disputes over interpretation are to be
determined by the courts under applicable general, nondiscrim-
inatory state law. There is no federal common law for these
validity defenses. Thus, a federal court must find and apply
the applicable state law of, say, unconscionability, unless that
law discriminates against the federal arbitration contract. In
short, the fact, meaning and quality of consent underlying the
federal contract to arbitrate are determined by generally
applicable state law.31
25 See id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
28 Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
27 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (FAA creates a substantive
rule applicable in state and federal courts and forecloses state legislative attempts
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements by withdrawing an includ-
ed claim from arbitration); see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (FAA pre-
empts state legislation that permits wage collection action to be maintained with-
out regard to existence of private agreement to arbitrate).
21 See Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that state legislation refusing to
enforce an agreement to arbitrate future disputes was inconsistent with and, thus,
preempted by FAA § 2).
2 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996) (state statute sin-
gling out contract to arbitrate for higher standards for disclosure preempted).
" The preemption doctrine has been harshly criticized by the commentators.
See, e.g., Shell, supra note 7, at 482-86.
3" State law is relevant to three questions that arise under FAA § 2: (1) for-
[V7ol. 62:13351342
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Finally, to date, the Court has not squarely considered the
scope of review of a final arbitration award where statutory or
regulatory claims are involved. Under section 10(d) of the FAA,
an award may be vacated "where the arbitrators exceeded
their authority, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter was not
made."32 This covers many excesses of consent by arbitrators.
Otherwise, the scope of review under FAA section 10 is quite
narrow, 33 and the oft mentioned non-statutory defense of
mation of the contract to arbitrate; (2) interpretation of the contract to arbitrate;
and (3) defenses to the enforcement of the contract to arbitrate the "savings"
clause in FAA § 2. Subject to the "liberal" policy favoring arbitration, the courts
should apply general principles of nondiscriminatory, applicable state law to each
question. The Court's explanation of how defenses to contract enforcement under
the "savings" clause should be treated follows these lines. The Court concedes that
a party "may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement
of an arbitration agreement." Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.1L As Mitsubishi put it-
"[C]ourts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to
arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that
would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.' Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985). In Perry, the Court
distinguished between the enforcement of the contract to arbitrate, which was a
matter of federal law, and defenses under the "savings" clause, which are a matter
of state law: "Thus, state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is appli-
cable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally." 482 U.S. at 493 n.9. This distinction was fol-
lowed in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995): The
court must apply ordinary state law principles that govern contract formation,
with a higher degree of consent where the question of "who" is to decide
arbitrability is raised. Id. at 1924. The distinction between general principles of
state law and discriminatory principles was tested in Doctor's Associates, where
state law denied enforcement only to arbitration contracts where notice of arbitra-
tion was not typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.
116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996). Since the parties did not agree that state arbitration law
should govern, the Court, relying on Southland and Perry, held that the state
discriminatory regulation was preempted. Id. at 1656. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995), on the other hand, the court applied
nondiscriminatory and applicable state contract law to assist in interpreting an
ambiguous contract. In holding that the agreement did not exclude punitive dam-
ages from the arbitrator's remedial powers, the Court also factored in the "liberal"
federal policy favoring arbitration.
2See IV MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 1, § 40.5.
"Restated, the grounds to vacate an award under FAA § 10 are limited to
cases where: (1) the award was procured by "corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) there was "evident partiality or corruption" in the arbitrators; (3) the arbitra-
tors were guilty of misconduct or misbehavior that prejudiced the rights of any
party;, and (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers to so imperfectly execute them
that a "mutual, final and definite" award was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
1996]
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"manifest disregard of law" has not received an authoritative
interpretation by the Court.34 The potential for that review,
however, seems to have appeased some critics of the Court's
purposeful, one-track approach to disputes over arbitrability."
For example, suppose the parties agree that the arbitration is
governed by New York arbitration law and New York law has
a special rule precluding punitive damages in arbitration. An
award of punitive damages might be vacated under FAA sec-
tion 10 if the arbitrator exceeded its authority (i.e., applied
Illinois law) and under the "manifest disregard" standard if the
arbitrator knew about the special New York preclusion and
chose to ignore it. Otherwise the merits are insulated from the
judicial review.
In sum, McMahon is simply one piece of the Court's
purposive interpretation of the FAA which exalts consent in
creating, defining and enforcing the federal contract to arbi-
trate. Under a broad arbitration clause, all disputes, including
those arising under state and federal regulatory legislation, are
within the scope of the contract to arbitrate and are appropri-
ate for arbitration. On the other hand, state law that with-
draws state created claims from arbitration or regulates the
validity of the federal contract to arbitrate in a discriminatory
manner is preempted, and federal statutory or constitutional
claims are arbitrable unless Congress has specifically excluded
them from arbitration. With state regulation effectively neu-
"' In First Options of Chicago, the Court, in dictum, went out of its way to
note that "manifest disregard of the law" was a nonstatutory ground to vacate an
award. This is a "very narrow standard of review," and the award will be con-
firmed if the Court "can find any line of argument that is legally plausible and
supports the award." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418,
421 (6th Cir. 1995); see Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at
232, where the Court mused: "Finally, we have indicated that there is no reason
to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law; although judicial
scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute." See Michael
P. O'Mullan, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Securities Arbitration: An
Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1121 (1994); see also Stephen L. Hayford & Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-
Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 22 (1996).
"5 For example, for purposes of Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415
(1994), the Sixth Circuit has recently held that the availability of review for mani-
fest disregard of the law is a "meaningful review" of punitive damage awards.
Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1996).
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tralized and Congress apparently reluctant to exercise its pre-
rogative to exclude claims, the power to create and enforce the
federal contract to arbitrate is, as a practical matter, unre-
stricted.36 To what extent, then, do the parties have broad
power to shape and control the arbitration process to which
they have both manifested assent?
II. POWER To CONTRACT: THE VOLT CASE
Within this protected environment, the Court has polished
the bright side of the consent coin in arbitration under the
FAA. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University,' the Court held that the
parties could, if they intended, choose state law, including its
arbitration law, to govern a contract to arbitrate otherwise
within the scope of the FAA. In choosing California law under
a broad choice of law clause, the parties intended to be bound
to a provision in the arbitration law permitting a stay of arbi-
tration pending litigation, even though there was no such pro-
vision in the FAA. Without the choice of California law, the
provision would probably have been preempted by the FAA.
Among other things, the Court stated that "arbitration under
the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are
generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they
see fit.""5 Private ordering, then, is permitted and encouraged
in the expansive area between state preemption by the FAA
and congressional inaction.
In the absence of coercion and the like, two questions
remain after Volt: (1) how far can the parties go in exercising
"G On the state preemption question, Paul D. Carrington has complained that
the "Court has ... transmogrified the 1925 Act to preempt the state law that it
was enacted to protect .... Thus, even state legislatures are disempowered to
provide that the laws they enact may be enforced in court notwithstanding adhe-
sion contract clauses calling for arbitration." Paul D. Carrington, ADR and Future
Adjudication: A Primer on Dispute Resolution, 15 REV. LITIG. 485, 501 (1996).
= 489 U.S. 468 (1989). For a perceptive comment, see Arthur S. Feldman, Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Universi-
ty: Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69 TEX. L. REV. 691
(1991).
z' Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
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their power to contract under the FAA?, and (2) how clear
must they be when attempting to do so? Both will be treated in
this Section.
A. Power to Contract
In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,39 a case where
there was no choice of law clause, the Court stated what ap-
pears to be the guiding spirit of Volt:
Volt involved an arbitration agreement that incorporated state pro-
cedural rules, one of which, on the facts of that case, called for arbi-
tration to be stayed pending the resolution of a related judicial pro-
ceeding. The state rule examined in Volt determined only the effi-
cient order of proceedings; it did not affect the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement itself. We held that applying the state rule
would not "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA"... be-
cause the very purpose of the Act was to "ensur[e] that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms."40
How far can the parties go in developing a tailor-made
contract to arbitrate under the FAA? 1 Assuming that there is
some written agreement to arbitrate,42 the lower courts have
pushed the Volt principle to the edge of federal policy favoring
enforcement. The arbitration agreement can limit the scope of
the agreement to arbitrate4" and select the administering in-
stitution and the applicable procedural rules. In addition, the
agreement can exclude certain statutory claims,44 specify the
details of the arbitral process, including the selection of arbi-
trators,45 confer broad remedial powers on the arbitrators,46
31 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
40 Id. at 1656-57.
1 Suppose, for example, the parties agreed that an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes arising under the contract was not enforceable; or that state arbi-
tration law requiring conspicuous and clear language before an agreement to arbi-
trate is enforceable and should apply?
41 See In re A.H. Robbins Co., 42 F.3d 870, 875 (4th Cir. 1994) (parties in
class action agree to arbitrate dispute).
4 See McMahan Co., L.P. v. Forum Capital Mkts., L.P., 35 F.3d 82, 86 (2d
Cir. 1994) (claim for misappropriation of assets was within scope of arbitration
agreement).
" See, e.g., Wolf v. Gruntal & Co., 45 F.3d 524, 527 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995)
(agreement excludes federal securities law claims); accord, Wiepking v. Prudential-
Bache Sec. Inc., 940 F.2d 996, 998 (6th Cir. 1991); Blue Gray Corps I & II v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 921 F.2d 267, 269 (11th Cir. 1991).
41 See Universal Reinsurance Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 16 F.3d 125, 129 (7th
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choose the situs for arbitration and the applicable substantive
law, and spell out the conditions for enforceability of the
award. Even without Volt, the power to contract in these situa-
tions is clear.
The Volt principle, however, has been extended to agree-
ments expanding the FAA's grounds for judicial review and
vacation of arbitral awards. Thus, in Gateway Technologies,
Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,47 the court enforced an
agreement permitting the courts to review an award for errors
in law even though that sort of review would not be available
under FAA section 10 or the "manifest disregard of law" excep-
tion. Since the agreement in Gateway was clear and otherwise
enforceable, the court concluded that it was supported by Volt
even though it limited the finality of awards under FAA
section 10.4
Despite the enforcement limitation expressed in Casarotto,
the parties under Volt should be able to choose state law that
conflicts or is inconsistent with the FAA and which, without
such an agreement, would otherwise be preempted. For exam-
ple, if the parties can agree to limit arbitration to existing
rather than future disputes, or to exclude certain claims aris-
ing under state law, or to grant the arbitrator remedy power
not available under the FAA, they should be able to choose
state law that accomplishes those same objectives. 9 For ex-
Cir. 1994) (arbitrator selection procedure), reh'g denied, No. 92-1559, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4828 (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 1994).
4" Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys. Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 11 n.5 (Ist Cir.
1989) (discussing punitive damages under American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
rules).
47 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); accord, Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mich., 916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Fils Et Cables D'Arcier De Lens v.
Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
48 The court noted that arbitration "is a creature of contract" and after review-
ing relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, concluded: "Because these parties
contractually agreed to expand judicial review, their contractual provision supple-
ments the FAA's default standard of review and allows for de novo review of is-
sues of law embodied in the arbitration award." Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996-97. This
reasoning, however, was rejected in Lapine Technologies Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,
909 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1995), an international arbitration. The court limited
Volt to agreements varying or providing for arbitration procedures, not cases
where the FAA itself was expanded. According to the Lapine Court, agreements of
this sort are against public policy because they detract from the speed and finality
of arbitration.
4" See Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1395-96 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
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ample, suppose the arbitration agreement clearly provided
that: (1) the arbitrator has power to award punitive damages;
(2) the availability of punitive damages on the merits is deter-
mined by New York law; or (3) a court may review an
arbitrator's punitive damage award for errors of law. All three
of these provisions are potentially enforceable by a court if
arbitration truly is a creature of contract. Thus, within that
broad area where the power to contract can coexist with the
liberal policy favoring enforcement, the rhetoric of "freedom to
arbitrate" is alive and well under the FAA.
B. Interpretation
It is one thing to have power to contract and quite another
to exercise that power in a balanced and clear manner. Consid-
er punitive damages and the Mastrobuono0 case. Under New
York law, arbitrators, as a matter of public policy, do not have
power to make punitive damage awards.5' Under the FAA,
however, the arbitrators apparently have such power if the
parties so agree." The potential for federal preemption of
state arbitration law on punitive damages therefore clearly
exists. Under a broad reading of Volt, however, the conflict can
be avoided if the parties agree either to permit the arbitrators
to award punitive damages or to deny that power.
In Mastrobuono, a securities arbitration case, the investor
signed a written, standard form that contained a broadly word-
ed clause choosing New York law. The clause did not clearly
say "New York arbitration law" and did not mention punitive
damages. Even though the choice of law agreement was no
more precise than that in Volt,5" the Court found an ambigu-
(choice of Connecticut arbitration law means that motion to vacate award must be
filed within 30 days even though FAA permits 90 days to file); see also Olde Dis-
count Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202, 215 (3d Cir. 1993) (Rosen, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1065 (1994).
"' Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); see
Kenneth R. Davis, Protected Right or Sacred Rite: The Paradox of Federal Arbitra-
tion Policy, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 65 (1995).
" Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 355, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (1976); see Aaron J. Polak, Punitive Damages in Commercial
Contract Arbitration-Still an Issue After All These Years, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 41 (1994).
' This power was confirmed in Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216.
'3 The dissent of Justice Thomas makes much of this point. Id. at 1219
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ity in the contract and, in a process that drew upon general
state law principles applicable to the interpretation of standard
form contracts and the "liberal" policy, construed the agree-
ment not to incorporate the New York arbitration limitation.
Thus, the preemption problem was avoided through an inter-
pretation process that construed ambiguous standard form
contracts against the drafter, the broker-dealer. But the power
of the parties clearly to include or deny punitive damage
awards under the FAA was not questioned. The issue was
simply the clarity with which the power to contract was exer-
cised.'
In sum, Volt and Mastrobuono speak directly to the power
of the parties to deal with punitive damages and other terms
in the contract to arbitrate securities disputes under the FAA.
In the absence of federal regulatory restraints, the arbitrator
may be granted or denied power to award punitive damages by
a clearly expressed term in the contract. Whether that term is
a well drafted choice of law provision or a more specific term is
immaterial.
IM. CONTRACTS OF ADHESION: THE DARK SIDE OF ARBITRATION
As Mastrobuono reveals, most contracts to arbitrate in the
securities industry have the characteristics of adhesion con-
tracts."5 These "take it or leave it" contracts to arbitrate raise
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
" Where Mastrobuono leaves us depends upon how one reads Volt. Professor
Davis, for one, criticizes the Court in Mastrobuono for coloring the interpretation
process with an implicit antipathy to the New York punitive damage rule but,
under Volt, would not enforce a clear agreement to adopt state law that conflicts
with the FAA. See Davis, supra note 50, at 73, 81-85. Others view Mastrobuono as
an interim defense against contracts of adhesion, but would not deny the power to
adopt conflicting state law by clear agreement. See Heather J. Haase, In Dzfense
of Parties' Rights to Limit Arbitral Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act:
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 309
(1996); Note, Punitive Damages Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 109 HARV. L.
REv. 269 (1995).
These characteristics include: (1) non-unique and repeated terms appear in
standard forms; (2) the standard terms are prepared primarily for the benefit of
the drafter; (3) the standard terms are likely to be unexamined and not easily
understood at the time of the agreement; and (4) the drafter is in a position to
insist that the other party "take it or leave it' without bargaining. See II
MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & ST1PANOWICH, supra note 1, § 19.3.3. A contract with adhe-
sion characteristics, however, may be enforceable unless it inflicts 'substantive
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two questions: (1) how far can one party go in requiring arbi-
tration of any and all claims arising under the investment con-
tract and imposing other terms in the contract to arbitrate,
such as a choice of law clause selecting law favorable to the
broker-dealer?; and (2) if such an agreement is enforceable, to
what extent are statutory and other regulatory claims of the
adhering party which are adjudicated by the arbitrator insulat-
ed from judicial review? If the answers are dictated simply by
the pro-enforcement rhetoric of Volt and the finality provisions
of section 10 of the FAA, then serious public policy questions
are presented, both as to investor protection against abuse of
bargaining power and the wisdom of insulating regulatory
claims created by state and federal law from judicial review.
A. Adhesion Contracts to Arbitrate Securities Disputes Are
Enforceable
Based upon the current case law, it is highly unlikely that
"unconscionability or adhesion doctrine [will] result in the
unenforceability of an arbitration clause.""8 Putting aside the
rare and inevitably unsuccessful challenge to the arbitration
clause on grounds of fraud, duress or mistake, 7 a party desir-
ing to win an unconscionability defense who objectively as-
sents58 to a standard form arbitration clause must establish
unfairness on the weaker party" or because its terms are not "within the reason-
able expectations of that party, or contrary to public policy." Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder
Sys., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aft'd, No. 96-7285, 1997 VL 160765
(2d Cir. Mar. 27, 1997). For discussion of other Supreme Court decisions where
adhesion contracts were involved, particularly Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585 (1991), superseded by 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183c (West Supp. 1996), see
Shell, supra note 7, at 460-62; Braucher, supra note 7, at 61-68.
56 11 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 1, § 19.3.1, at 19:26.
5 II MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 1, § 19.2; see Jonathan E.
Breckenridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate: Judicial and
Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to Arbitration Agreements, 1991 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 925; Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law,
74 OR. L. REv. 1131, 1189-92 (1995) (California retrenchment in use of unconscio-
nability in arbitration disputes).
5 The most common form of objective assent, although not required by the
FAA, is a signature on a contract containing an arbitration clause or on the arbi-
tration clause itself. Consent to arbitration may also be by conduct. See II
MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 1, § 17.7.3. Assuming that the
assenting party has an opportunity to review the standard form and that there
are no validity defenses, the intention in fact of the assenting party is irrelevant.
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that he or she was: (1) unfairly surprised by the arbitration
clause and its effect or, if there was disclosure, denied an ade-
quate choice because there were no realistic market alterna-
tives; and (2) disadvantaged because the arbitration clause or
the contemplated arbitration process was unduly favorable to
the other party.59 In securities arbitration, this is a difficult
burden to sustain.
A recurring judicial pattern has emerged on the path to
enforceability under the "savings" clause of FAA section 2.
First, although the Court has stated that under the FAA the
courts must remain "attuned" to the risk of fraud or coercion,
it has also said that the fact of unequal bargaining power
alone is not enough to invalidate the federal contract to arbi-
trate.60 What more is necessary apparently depends upon the
facts of each case and the application of nondiscriminatory
state law.61 For example, it is proper for the SEC to protect
against unfair bargains by regulating the SROs and the con-
tent of securities arbitration contracts and procedures. It is
improper, however, for the State of Montana or any state to
single out the federal standard form contract to arbitrate for
special protection against unfair surprise." That "special pro-
tection," if not applicable to every adhesion contract, is pre-
empted.
For example, there is no requirement that the assenting party intend to assume
an obligation to arbitrate, even though that may be a plausible theoretical posi-
tion. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269 (1986). Rather, objective assent coupled with a preferred outcome (here
arbitration) is a dominant theme in Supreme Court adjudication. See G. Richard
Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 433 (1993).
" See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996), for a recent summary of the
principles. Most courts require an absence of "meaningful choice" together with a
term which is "unreasonably favorable" to the other party. Since an arbitration
term is normally balanced (i.e., it does not necessarily favor either party), under
the "together with" test it would be enforceable if assented to without fraud or
mistake, even if there was no meaningful choice.
6' For a summary, see supra text accompanying note 33.
61 See Webb v. InvestaCorp, 89 F.3d 252, 257 (5th Cir. 1996) (arbitration
clause not unconscionable under nondiscriminatory Texas law).
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995),
the Court, speaking through Justice Breyer, noted that Congress had consumers in
mind when enacting the FAA, but concluded, in dictum, that the best way to
protect consumers was in general state regulation of standard form or unfair con-
tracts, not just regulation where arbitration is involved.
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Second, the objective of the standard arbitration form
clause is favored under the FAA. On the face of it, there is no
attempt by one party to impose an unreasonable term on the
other. Both parties contract out of the judicial forum, with its
procedural protections and right to a jury trial," and agree to
arbitration with its strengths and weaknesses. There is no
obvious disadvantage to either party, especially where the
substantive terms in the arbitration clause are not unreason-
ably favorable to the stronger party."
Third, except in unusual circumstances,65 the risk of un-
fair surprise is placed upon the party who assents to a stan-
dard form containing an arbitration clause. The adhering party
has a duty to read the standard form," and the stronger par-
ty has no duty to disclose or discuss the arbitration clause.
Again, as the Court's decision in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto68 clearly indicates, state law aimed at eliminating
fraud or unfair surprise only in arbitration contracts is pre-
' Clearly, some type of informed consent to arbitration is necessary to waivo
the constitutional right to a jury trial. Outside of the arbitration context, courts
require a "knowing and intentional" waiver of the right to a jury trial. Relevant
factors include the clarity and prominence with which the language is expressed,
the sophistication of the parties, whether they are represented by counsel, and
their relative bargaining power. See Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F.
Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1996) (discussing authorities). Inside arbitration, however, the
"jury trial waiver" issue is rarely raised. The assumption is that if there is assent
to a written, broad arbitration clause, the right to a jury trial is waived, despite
the absence of one or more factors. See Brunet, supra note 23, at 102-13.
" In Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D. Cal. 1996), the
court stated: "Although it is not inconceivable that an arbitration clause might be
written in such a way as to favor one side, the clause in this case applies equally
to both parties: both give up the right to trial by jury and agree to abide by the
procedures described. Neither state nor federal law would find such a clause unen-
forceable." In general accord, see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 980-
81 (2d Cir. 1996); Hoffman v. Aaron Kamhi, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 640, 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (arbitration clause not unconscionable simply because one party drafts it);
Haluska v. RAF Fin. Corp., 875 F. Supp. 825, 828 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Bevere v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 862 F. Supp. 1243, 1249-50 (D.N.J. 1994).
" In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995),
the Court, using nondiscriminatory state law, construed ambiguous language in a
standard form against the drafter.
" See, e.g., Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31 F.3d 692, 695-96 (8th Cir. 1994);
Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Vetter, 838 F. Supp. 468 (D. Mont. 1993).
67 In Gouger v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 823 F. Supp. 282, 286-88 (E.D. Pa. 1993),
the court rejected the argument that a broker had any duty to identify or explain
a choice of law clause contained in a standard form arbitration agreement.
6' 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
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empted by the FAA. Special notice requirements designed to
increase information in adhesion contracts must be applicable
to contracts generally, not just the federal contract to arbi-
trate.69
Fourth, if there is no unfair surprise, the content of the
form is clear and arbitration is favored by the law, the fact
that the adhering party had no power to bargain with the
stronger party is not significant. There is still a choice to
"leave it," and in most cases that choice is not oppressive. Al-
though not fully explored by the courts, the assumption is that
the investor can, after comparative shopping, find a broker-
dealer willing to open a similar investment account without an
arbitration clause. Thus, even if an investor cannot open a
margin account with any broker-dealer without agreeing to
arbitration, the choice to leave it and the possibility that simi-
lar accounts can be arranged without arbitration protect the
clause from attack."
Finally, if the adhering party can demonstrate that the
proposed arbitration rules or processes are not impartial-that
they favor the stronger party-the arbitration might be en-
joined." But this possibility is rare indeed, especially if neu-
tral and respected agencies such as the AAA are selected or, in
Id. at 1656; accord, Soil Remediaton Co. v. Nu-way Envtl., Inc., 476 S.E.2d
149 (S.C. 1996) (South Carolina law preempted).
"o There are few instances where this dimension of unconscionability has been
satisfied. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 84-94 (N.J.
1959) (automobile manufacturers have oligopolistic control of new car warranty
content); see also Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971)
("The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a posi-
tion to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard
contract has a monopoly [natural or artificiall or because all competitors use the
same clauses."). Despite the valiant dissent of Justice Stevens, the argument was
rejected in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (forum selec-
tion clause); see California Grocers Ass'n, Inc. v. Bank of America, 27 Cal. Rptr.
2d 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (competition for fees charged by San Francisco banks).
In securities arbitration, we must know whether a customer can obtain a margin
account from a broker-dealer without an arbitration clause. Can larger investors,
such as mutual funds, bargain to exclude arbitration? Are arbitration clauses re-
quired in cash accounts and, if so, to what extent? How easy is it for a customer
to finance a cash account without an arbitration clause by opening a bank line of
credit? What about the practices of discount brokers? No authoritative study has
been done to answer these questions.
71 See II MTACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 1, § 19.3.3.3. Such a
claim was rejected on the facts in Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 43
Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 905 P.2d 416 (Cal. 1995).
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securities arbitration, where the rules and procedures of the
SRO have been approved by the SEC.72 Thus, where the
choice to arbitrate is "take it or leave it," but the content of the
contract to arbitrate is mainly AAA rules and the arbitration is
administered by the AAA, the unconscionability defense simply
will not work. Similarly, where the SEC has power to regulate
the activities of the SROs in arbitration and the SROs are
working to improve their arbitration processes and procedures,
the court is unlikely to deny enforcement of the agreement to
arbitrate.
In sum, the adhesion contract to arbitrate, particularly in
the securities industry, is enforceable under section 2 of the
FAA. According to the courts, the absence of equal bargaining
power or the opportunity to bargain does not necessarily signal
unfair surprise or oppression to the weaker party or unfair
advantage to the stronger party. So long as both parties agree
in writing to arbitrate all disputes in an unbiased or impartial
arbitration process, the contract is valid and enforceable under
the FAA.
B. The Dark Side of Limited Judicial Review
From the perspective of enforceability of the agreement to
arbitrate, the judicial rejection of the unconscionability defense
in adhesion contracts to arbitrate is defensible. From the per-
spective of the limited judicial review of arbitral awards, how-
ever, the result is more troublesome. The investor cannot bar-
gain to exclude statutory claims from the scope of arbitration
and, as a practical matter, may have limited market alterna-
tives. Put differently, an investor who understands what arbi-
tration is and has a choice to leave the proposed adhesion
contract may be unable to find a similar investment account
without an arbitration clause. If so, the choice to 'qeave it," no
matter how well informed, may be no choice at all. Where
there are no realistic alternatives, the adhesion pattern repre-
sents a form of mandatory arbitration that insulates the merits
72 See Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble,
Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988).
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from judicial review and creates the risk that the adhering
party will be bound to other terms, such as a choice of law
clause, that is highly favorable to the other party.
One must be careful not to overstate these risks. For ex-
ample, an attempt in a standard term to require the adhering
party to waive or forego certain statutory claims otherwise
within the agreement to arbitrate will probably not be success-
ful," even though waiver of the right to jury trial through
consent to arbitration will be enforced. It is one thing to shift
the dispute from a court to an arbitral tribunal and quite an-
other to cut back the rights to which one party would other-
wise be entitled in the adhesion contract.
On the other hand, if statutory or other regulatory claims
are decided by impartial arbitrators in an effective, neutral
arbitration process, the merits of those claims are normally
insulated from judicial review. Accepting for argument the
Court's assumption that such claims are appropriate for arbi-
tration and that arbitrators are capable of resolving them, the
lack of review on the merits under FAA section 10 permits
important decisions affecting public policy to be resolved with-
out judicial scrutiny. Unless the parties have agreed to an
expanded review or the Court fully endorses the "manifest
disregard of law" standard, stronger parties can use the arbi-
tration process to blunt the force of federal and state regula-
tion. Moreover, the Court has preempted efforts by the states
to withdraw such claims from broad arbitration clauses or to
regulate the arbitration process in a way that discriminates
against the federal contract to arbitrate.
In sum, the Supreme Court's purposeful interpretation of
the FAA, with its formalistic approach to enforcement, pro-
vides no direct controls over the adhesion contract to arbitrate.
Even when powerful broker-dealers operate in a regulated
industry and there is a common approach by them toward
requiring arbitration of all disputes arising under or relating to
certain investment accounts, the contract to arbitrate is en-
forced, and arbitral awards interpreting and applying those
statutes are not reviewed on the merits. Whatever the benefits
of informed and efficient dispute resolution, burying the out-
See, e.g., Graham Oil v. Arco Prods., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995).
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comes of statutory claims against the regulated party in un-
published and unreviewable arbitral decisions is a highly ques-
tionable use of the federal contract to arbitrate.
IV. THE RUDER REPORT: WHITHER CONSENT?
How did the NASD Arbitration Task force deal with these
issues on the dark side of the consent coin? With one excep-
tion, the Ruder Report did not recommend that the scope and
quality of private consent be enhanced to improve securities
arbitration. A return to the pre-McMahon days74 was not rec-
ommended, and a study of the extent to which an investor who
decides to "leave it" can realistically find an alternative invest-
ment contract without an arbitration clause was not commis-
sioned.75 Rather, the Report endorsed the current "adhesion"
method of contracting, concluding that there was "no evidence
that SRO sponsored securities arbitration forums were biased
against customer participants""6 and that "even with its flaws,
securities arbitration is clearly preferable to civil litigation."7
"' Prior to McMahon, an investor who opened an investment account could
agree to arbitration or not. The broker-dealer, however, had no such choice and
was bound by the investor's election. See RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 6-7.
"' The perceived choices were summarized as follows: "IMlost individual inves-
tors who transact in business with broker-dealers, and virtually all individual
investors who have margin or option accounts, must resolve claims with member
firms in SRO sponsored arbitration." RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
"' RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 9. The Report relied upon a 1992 Report
of the General Accounting Office and the fact that between "1991 and 1995, arbi-
trators awarded damages to customer claimants in 50 percent of all cases they
decided." RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 18. "Moreover, securities arbitration is
conducted by SRO's subject to the direct oversight and regulation of the SEC, not
by individual member firms. Further, disputes between customers and member
firms are heard either by a single 'public' arbitrator, that is, a person not affili-
ated with the securities industry, or, in most cases, by two public arbitrators and
one arbitrator associated with the securities industry, thus furthering the goal of
impartiality." RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 9.
" "Arbitration offers investors a more efficient, faster, and cheaper process
than court litigation." RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 18. No empirical studies
were conducted or cited to support this important but impressionistic conclusion.
On the importance of empirical studies in dispute resolution, see Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the United States
Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65 (1996); see also Russell J.
Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 2-4
(need for empirical data in understanding contract).
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Thus, the Ruder Report recommended that the "industry
should be permitted to continue to utilize predispute arbitra-
tion clauses in customer agreements.""8
The one exception was enhanced disclosure requirements:
"Predispute arbitration agreements should contain certain
uniform provisions, including the statement that the FAA
governs NASD securities arbitration, and should provide clear
notice that the customer is entering into an arbitration agree-
ment and the consequences."79 No window, however, was pro-
vided for an investor to opt out of NASD arbitration for AAA
securities arbitration, and no recommendations were made to
expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards. The
Report attempts to preserve the nature and objectives of pri-
vate arbitration in an industry regulated by the SEC without
enhancing the role of consent or expanding the scope of judicial
review.
Beyond expanded disclosure in the contract to arbitrate,
the Ruder Report made two recommendations relevant to the
contracting process and several recommendations designed to
improve the efficiency and fairness of the arbitration process
itself. First, it endorsed Rule 21(f)(4) of the NASD Rules of
Fair Practice, as approved by the SEC, which provides that
"[nlo agreement [between a member and a customer] shall in-
clude any condition... which limits the ability of a party to
file any claim in arbitration or limits the ability of the arbitra-
tors to make any award."" This long standing rule attempts
to neutralize the power and the incentive of broker-dealers to
limit substantive claims as part of the arbitration agreement.
In short, investors in arbitration are entitled to the applicable
state and federal law.
Second, to implement the fair practice rule, the Ruder
Report recommended limitations on the content of certain
"' RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 17. Although both parties can agree to
forego arbitration or to arbitrate before an institution other than an SRO, the
customer cannot unilaterally make that decision.
79 RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 19.
80 RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 17. The SEC, in approving the NASD
Rule, stated that the use of arbitration "represents solely a choice of arbitration as
a means of dispute resolution" and that agreements "cannot be used to curtail any
rights that a party may otherwise have had in a judicial forum." 54 Fed. Reg.
21,144, 21,154 (1989).
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terms regularly included by broker-dealers in the contract to
arbitrate. For example, to offset the broker-dealers' power to
choose the arbitration law of a state that precludes an arbitral
award of punitive damages, the Report recommended that
"NASD develop a uniform rule relating to the availability of
punitive damages in NASD arbitration" and that the rule
should "state clearly that punitive damages are available in
each state where they are permitted in a judicial forum for the
same claims."8' Moreover, the applicable law is the "state of
the investor's domicile where they would be available in court
for the same claims."8 2
Beyond this, the Report relies upon the SROs and the SEC
and, perhaps, the active participation of representative organi-
zations such as the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitra-
tion ("SICA")5 ' to further regulate the exercise of contractual
power by the broker-dealers and to implement other recom-
mended reforms going to the efficiency and quality of the arbi-
tration process."
Whither consent after the Ruder Report? In essence, the
quality of consent is enhanced by better information on wheth-
er or not to take securities arbitration at the threshold of con-
tracting. Either choice has its disadvantages. The decision to
"leave it" may mean that the investor has, in the relevant
competitive market, no access to an investment contract with-
out arbitration from another similarly situated broker. The
decision to "take it" means that the investor must depend upon
other individuals and organizations to insure that other terms
in the contract to arbitrate are balanced and fair, and that the
rules and processes administered by the cognizant SRO are de-
' This is particularly true in the controversial area of punitive damages. See
RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 40-46.
82 RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 45.
See generally Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 485-90 (1996).
" Other recommendations include: (1) increased use of mediation and a pilot
program on early neutral evaluation of claims, RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at
54-64; (2) simplified procedures for claims not exceeding $30,000, RUDER REPORT,
supra note 11, at 71-76; (3) improved information requests and document discov-
ery, RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 81-87; and (4) a series of proposals on the
selection and quality of arbitrators, RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 88-113. At
the time of this writing, the process of implementing the Report's recommenda-
tions is well underway.
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signed to achieve efficient and responsive outcomes. Either
way, validity issues in the investor's choice are not directly
regulated by the FAA, and the so-called contract to arbitrate is
on the other or the "dark side" of the consent coin.
CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE RUDER REPORT?
What does the decline of consent mean for the future of
arbitration in the securities industry? Adhesion or standard
form contracts are a fact of commercial and consumer life. In
addressing this method of contracting, courts and legislatures
are more concerned with preventing unfair surprise through
disclosure than assessing the market options if the deal is
rejected or regulating the content of the adhesion contract
itself. The focus is on the disclosure process rather than the
content of the contract.ss The Ruder Report, on the other
hand, recommends both increased disclosure and some regula-
tion of the content of the contract to arbitrate rather than
suggesting methods to improve bargaining between parties or
to stimulate market competition between investment accounts
with and without arbitration clauses. In short, the Ruder Re-
port seems to endorse a public rather than a private model of
dispute resolution: Informed choice coupled with increased
regulation of the contract to arbitrate and the arbitration pro-
cess is the proposed solution.
Assume that this approach to "mandatory" arbitration is
the right way to go.s The crucial question is whether the
' See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 34-51 (1993). Writing from the per-
spective of an economist, Professor Craswell would support governmental interven-
tion into a contracting process where there was adequate information only when
there was a market failure and the government could do a better job than the
market in supplying the alternative. As Jean Braucher put it, "Assent is not in
fact a useful way to look at the question of when to enforce contingent terms in
long forms. It makes more sense to ask whether disclosure promotes sufficient
market competition to police against imposition by one party of unwanted terms
by the other." Braucher, supra note 7, at 63. In securities arbitration, at least,
there is reason to believe that "sufficient market competition is lacking.
' Clearly it is not the only way to go. For example, Dean Seligman has sug-
gested that a "different approach would allow securities brokers to make differen-
tial charges to customers, depending on whether the customer wishes to retain the
right to litigate or is willing to sign a predispute agreement." He argues that an
"internalization approach would respond to long held concerns about customers'
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classic model of private arbitration, with its characteristics and
objectives, is best suited for a regulated industry where all
claims, statutory or otherwise, are required by the regulated
party to be arbitrated with the probability that awards on the
merits may be insulated from judicial review. The Court, under
the FAA, has fostered the view that arbitration is suitable for
every dispute regardless of the parties, context or issues. As
one commentator put it, the current exalted status of FAA
arbitration represents a "window of opportunity created by the
interaction of the ... Court's charitable view of the process,
the log jam in the courts, and the concerns of business deci-
sion-makers with the costs and other problems associated with
traditional litigation.""7 If that window closes or the opportu-
nity disserves either efficiency or fairness, a reconsideration of
the private arbitration model as the appropriate mode for secu-
rities dispute resolution should be undertaken.88
If doubts about classic arbitration exist, how can a securi-
ties dispute resolution system be developed that, although
minimizing the importance of consent, is "cost effective, proce-
durally consistent, and fair, and capable, as a matter of course,
of producing outcomes that are accurate and correct?"89 Such
an alternative system was not proposed by the Ruder Report,
and its details are beyond the scope of this Article. Neverthe-
less, thinking about the new "public" system might take the
following considerations into account:
(1) A more persuasive empirical justification for mandatory
arbitration, rather than permitting investors and broker-deal-
ers to choose adjudication in courts, is needed. The question is
whether the overall system is more efficient than adjudication
in courts and capable of reaching decisions that are responsive
to the applicable law and facts and fair between the parties. If
lack of negotiating leverage and protect securities brokers from greater cost of
litigation." Seligman, supra note 11, at 345-46. For objections to this proposal, see
Becker, supra note 11, at 372; Coffee, supra note 11, at 377.
" Hayford & Peeples, supra note 4, at 413-14.
In another article I have expressed doubts about the capacity of classic arbi-
tration in regulated industries to achieve results that are efficient, fair and consis-
tent with relevant public interests. Speidel, supra note 4, at 162-67.
" Hayford & Peeples, supra note 4, at 414.
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not, a system that gives broker-dealers power to decide wheth-
er investors must take arbitration or leave it makes no sense
at all.
(2) An increased willingness of the SEC through the SROs
to regulate the terms of the contract to arbitrate between the
investors and the broker-dealers, particularly choice of law
clauses, and to develop uniform standards in hotly contested
areas such as eligibility to arbitrate and punitive damages is
also needed.
(3) A renewed effort should be made to reduce the persis-
tent impression that SRO administered arbitration is biased in
favor of broker-dealers. As Dean Joel Seligman suggested, the
data in the 1992 GAO study "may now be stale and in any
event cry out for amplification." At a minimum, the repre-
sentation of private investors' interests in the development of
applicable rules and procedures through such groups as SICA
should be strengthened and investor choice and the role of
"public" arbitrators should be enhanced."
(4) Efforts to clarify when and what state law governs the
merits of a dispute and to draft, where appropriate, uniform
rules for application to securities arbitration should be made.
The confusion and controversy over such questions as the eligi-
bility rule and punitive damages are stimulated in part by
disagreement over these choice of law questions. Clarity, uni-
formity and sound results might be enhanced if, for example, a
uniform, preemptive statute of limitations were drafted or the
grounds for the award of punitive damages were defined.'
(5) Accepting the need to improve the impartiality and
quality of the arbitrators selected and to decide exactly what
issues they should decide, attention must be paid to the timing
and scope of judicial review. After leaving questions of
arbitrability to the courts, the Ruder Report recommends that
all other issues be resolved by the arbitrators and that judicial
review be deferred until after the award.'3 Nothing was said,
" Seligman, supra note 11, at 367.
', See RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 94-97. A new study on investor satis-
faction with NASD arbitration has just been completed. See MGA COwmi1NlcA-
TIONS, INC., OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, A STUDY OF THE ARBITRATION PRO-
CESS FOR NASD REGULATION (Aug. 20, 1996).
'2 See RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 22.46, for the Task Force's recommen-
dations on these issues.
w RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 31-33. The recommendations focused on
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however, about requiring written opinions with reasons by
arbitrators' or altering the usual restrictive review under
Section 10 of the FAA.
A new system might require a term in the contract to
arbitrate that permits courts to review arbitral awards for
errors in applicable law. The review could be limited to deci-
sions on punitive damages or the scope and effect of regulatory
legislation. Agreements of this sort are arguably within the
scope of Volt, although there is some authority to the con-
trary.95 Such a decision would clearly signal the public inter-
est involved in the arbitration process and allay concerns that
important decisions that apply regulatory legislation are insu-
lated from judicial review. But it would undercut one essential
ingredient of arbitration-finality-and tend to lengthen re-
view proceedings. And, as one commentator has noted, "such
review would require written arbitration opinions-not com-
mon in the commercial arena-and probably a more complete
record and more formal proceedings than are generally main-
tained. These requirements would add to both the expense and
formality of arbitration."96
Whither consent in securities arbitration? As much as we
may cherish and support "freedom to contract," the conditions
generating the question reside on the dark side of the consent
coin. Since it is unlikely that informed consent, bargaining and
realistic market opportunities can be easily restored, the an-
swer points toward a more overtly public system of dispute
resolution in the securities industry. That system, which has
yet to be designed, can require informed consent but cannot
rely upon consent as a primary method of regulating the feder-
the so-called eligibility rule, but a broader application was intended.
" But see RUDER REPORT, supra note 11, at 44, where it is recommended that
an award that includes punitive damage "should specify the amount given for
compensatory damages and the amount given for punitive damages [and] where
requested by the party against whom the award is rendered, should describe the
conduct giving rise to the award." This recommendation permits the parties and a
reviewing court to determine whether the arbitrators have exceeded their authority
by awarding punitive damages in excess of the recommended "cap." RUDER RE-
PORT, supra note 11, at 42.
"5 See supra notes 47-48. For an intriguing possibility for limited judicial inter-
vention, see Michael A. Scodro, Comment, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A
Recommendation, 105 YALE L.J. 1927 (1996).
" See Hugh R. McCombs & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Arbitration, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19,
1996, at B-5.
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al contract to arbitrate. Because consent has withered in secu-
rities arbitration, the pressing question is, therefore, whither
the public interest model of arbitration implicit in the Ruder
Report?

